Last week I received a phone call at work from FOX News in Washington D. C. They wanted to send a crew up here to look at the items we hold concerning the D-Day landings that occurred on June 6, 1944. That very same day, a box of items was found in our classification vault. The box was from the Arthur S. Nevins Collection. Nevins was Eisenhower’s assistant in the War Plans Division, on the Army’s General Staff, and a close friend of the Supreme Commander. The documents within the box include a document from June 5, 1944, seventy years ago today, detailing how the Allied Commanders met in the early hours of the morning to discuss Operation OVERLORD. This was one meeting in a long series regarding the execution of the invasion of Normandy, and featured great concern over “chancey” weather conditions. The document pictured here are pages 1 and 2 of the original copy of the memorandum of record detailing the final Commanders’ Meetings, which occurred on June 4, 1944, at 9:30 PM, and again on June 5, 1944, at 4:15am.
For decades now it has been almost taken as gospel that Ike and the rest of the Allied planners completely failed in even noticing the bocage, the notorious Norman hedgerows that held up the US Army inland during the Normandy campaign. The bocage slowed the Allied assault down for the rest of June and the better part of July, until Bradley’s Operation COBRA began a breakout of that bitterly contested French countryside towards the end of July 1944. COBRA was a success, but many Americans had died fighting in the small country lanes of Normandy. Immediately and now for decades afterward, the blame was laid at the feet of men like Eisenhower, Bradley, and their staffs.
Interestingly, also within Nevins’ collection is a photo, map, and some documents pertaining to the bocage:
Included within that same folder is a typed report on the forests and bocage. I’m including a photo of the document (as well as a close-up of the same page) which discusses the bocage and how they may or may not be useful to the men that had to do the fighting in the fierce French foliage. In my estimation, the planners did not leave out the bocage, but perhaps in typical military thinking, just figured they’d cross that bridge when they came to it. England also has hedgerows, although they are quite different from the ones in France. The English hedgerows were typically smaller and not as thick as the French bocage. American troops had conducted training in these smaller English hedgerows, but it took good ‘ol American ingenuity to cut through the denser ones in France as the GIs also had to learn how to launch attacks against Germans making good use of the bocage.
I have not come across any evidence showing the Allies totally ignored the bocage, so where did this long-held belief of negligent military intelligence come from (other than the oft-mocked oxymoron “military intelligence” itself)? Surely Allied operatives and French Resistance members on the scene relayed information on Normandy’s terrain back to England before the invasion. Was it then just a fundamental misunderstanding on how large these formations could be? Some confusion is obvious from a statement within the report itself, and I quote: “It is difficult to judge whether such terrain favors defending or attacking infantry.” So in some ways, perhaps, the Allies did not know what the French bocage was all about. But to state they missed it or ignored it is completely false. In any case, the Germans once again made great and strong defenses from the hedgerows, as they had the bombed-out abbey at Monte Cassino, and as they would again later in the Hurtgen Forest, making the Allies pay dearly in blood for every square-inch of ground gained during the war.
And a close-up of the same document: